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Strategic Interactions between Fiscal and 
Monetary Authorities in a Multi-Country 




In this paper we consider a number of key issues related to the policy coordination in a 
monetary union that has been recently discussed in the literature. To this end we propose a 
multi-country New-Keynesian model of a monetary union cast in the framework of linear 
quadratic differential games. Our framework can be used to simulate strategic interactions 
between an arbitrary number of fiscal authorities interacting in coalitions with or against the 
common central bank. For many parameter combinations our results confirm the findings of 
Beetsma et al. (2001) that for symmetric inflation and output gap shocks, fiscal coordination 
between all the countries is counter-productive within a monetary union. The clash between 
the central bank and the coalition of national governments is most intense under a symmetric 
inflation shocks when there is strong conflict concerning the orientation of stabilisation 
policies. This conflict is less pronounced under an asymmetric inflation and output gap 
shocks, however, still makes fiscal cooperation unattractive. We extend the existing New-
Keynesian literature on policy coordination by considering not only cases of non-
coordination, fiscal cooperation and the grand coalition, but also the partial cooperation 
arrangements between fiscal players. We show that, in many cases, partial fiscal coordination 
of a subgroup of fiscal players is more efficient, from the social point of view, than non-
coordination. However, this regime still delivers poor results from the perspective of 
individual players. This occurs especially in the case of asymmetric shocks, as the countries 
directly affected by the shocks tend to "export" losses to the countries with whom they form a 
coalition. Furthermore, we show that the common objective of the grand coalition is of the 
upmost importance for the outcome of the stabilisation process. 
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November, 2008 1 Introduction
The creation of the (multi-country) European Monetary Union (EMU), with a common central bank, yet in-
dependent national scal policies, urged the ongoing discussion about the need and the feasibility of macroe-
conomic policy coordination within a monetary union. Since the `one-size-ts-all' policy of the European
Central Bank (ECB) cannot address country-specic shocks, and the other stabilisation mechanisms in the
euro-zone (such as labour force mobility and nancial assets mobility) are limited, the general consensus is
that the main burden of stabilisation should be born by scal policies. However, the abuse of scal poli-
cies can be detrimental to both nancial and economic stability and may result in undesirable suboptimal
outcomes. Consequently, budgetary positions in the EMU Member States are constrained (mainly by the
provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact, SGP) and are monitored by the European Commission (EC).
This situation gives rise to several important questions which are relevant, not only specically to the EMU,
but also to monetary unions in general:
1. Is there a need for the coordination of monetary and scal policies in macro-economic stabilisation?
2. Do dierent types of shocks call for dierent forms of cooperation?
3. Can cooperation in a monetary union be counter-productive and if so, under which conditions?
4. Will scal constraints like SGP hamper stabilisation?
5. How does SGP inuence possible cooperation agreements between scal or scal and monetary author-
ities?
The literature on monetary unions is vast and some of the above issues have already been extensively
discussed. This paper extends this literature by presenting and analysing a multi-country New-Keynesian
(NK) model of a monetary union which is cast in the framework of open-loop linear quadratic dierential
games (LQDGs) including multi-player strategic elements. To the best of our knowledge, it is the rst model
in the New(-Keynesian) Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) spirit to feature strategic elements be-
tween more than three players. Essentially, the starting point of the NK approach is the explicit derivation
of macroeconomic relationships from underlying microeconomic foundations. This principle is largely shared
with New Classical macroeconomics, although the former includes a great deal of imperfections in the goods
and labor markets. Recently, NK macroeconomics has constituted the core of the macroeconomic paradigm
world-wide, with a great deal of research eort directed towards the issue of optimal monetary policy. How-
ever, until now, relatively little attention has been paid to the interactions between scal and monetary
policies when stabilising an economy after a shock; something that is especially important in the EMU con-
text.1 The strength of our NK model is its multi-player (monetary union countries and the central bank)
strategic dimension, which allows us to address all the above research questions in one study. Throughout
this paper, we show that non-trivial conclusions can be drawn from analysing scal cooperation between only
a subgroup of countries in a monetary union. The remainder of this subsection summarises the main ndings
of our research.
Studies analysing the desirability of policy coordination in a monetary union provide mixed results. On
the one hand, many authors support the classic result of the Optimal Currency Area (OCA) that policy
coordination is desirable in case of symmetric shocks. For instance, Buti and Sapir (1998) argue that coor-
dination of scal policies should be implemented to tackle large symmetric shocks. However, on the other
hand, there are a number of studies that demonstrate that policy coordination can provide inferior levels of
welfare. Notably, in a two-country model of a monetary union, Beetsma et al. (2001) nd scal cooperation
to be counter-productive as a result of the elevated conict with the central bank. We discuss this issue in the
framework of a dynamic multi-country NK model of a monetary union, in which multiple-scal authorities
and the central bank enter into various coordination arrangements in order to play in coalitions against each
other in the LQDG framework. Our approach adds new dimensions to that of Beetsma et al. (2001). First
of all, the model has much richer NK specication. Secondly, in our approach, strategic interactions become
dynamic. Furthermore, a multi-country model enables us to study various intermediate coordination regimes
between scal players (partial scal cooperation). Finally, we consider cooperation between the central bank
and multiple scal players (i.e. the grand coalition) in the same manner in which other recent but only
two-country NK studies have done.2
1See the next section for a selection of papers that analyse this issue in the spirit of NOEMs.
2See next section for a short literature review on policy coordination in a monetary union.
2Our ndings support those of Beetsma et al. (2001), illustrating that, for symmetric ination and output
gap shocks, scal coordination between all the countries is counter-productive within a monetary union. Signs
and magnitude of spillovers from policies of scal and monetary authorities are pivotal to our analysis. The
rst ones are positive, i.e. expansionary scal stance in a member state of a monetary union increases output
gap in other countries. Conversely, the second ones are negative, i.e. a (real) interest rate has a negative
impact on output gaps. Additionally, it is assumed that the use of both policies or deviation from the rules
that both authorities previously agreed to abide by, is increasingly costly. In such a setting, positive scal
spillovers create strong incentives for non-cooperating governments to free-ride on each others' stabilisation
eorts. Usually free-riding is considered to be detrimental for economic eciency. However, in both Beetsma
et al. (2001) and our analysis, free-riding proves to be the key factor making certain regimes more protable
than others. More specically, free-riding of scal players reduces their stabilisation eort which, in turn,
diminishes the conict with the central bank. Consequently, everybody is better o, especially in the case of
an ination shock where the potential for conict is the greatest. In contrast, full scal coordination rules
out free-riding and increases governments' activism. This brings about results in direct opposition to those
expected by the governments, since the central bank replies to increased scal activism with much rmer
monetary policy, meaning that everybody ends up worse o.
The clash between the central bank and the coalition of national governments is most intense under
symmetric ination shocks when there is strong conict concerning the orientation of stabilisation policies.
In this context, Beetsma et al. (2001) argue that cooperation between scal authorities in a monetary union
might become protable when the asymmetry of shocks increases. The rationale behind this argument is
that, in such a situation, the central bank has fewer incentives to enter into a conict with a coalition of
governments because the average price increase is smaller. In connection to this, when the asymmetry is
stronger, the average deviation of ination will be more moderate and there will potentially be less discord
between authorities.3 The results of our model conrm, in many cases, the above position of Beetsma et al.
(2001). However, it should be noted that, in this context, a strong distinction between ination and the
output gap shocks exists.
Under an asymmetric ination shock there is a noticeable reduction in the control eort of all the players
caused by the restrained reaction of the central bank. However, it is still not enough to make scal cooperation
protable. In other words, an asymmetry of a price shock, indeed, makes the conict between all cooperating
governments and the central bank less pronounced, yet does not make such a regime benecial w.r.t. non-
cooperation.
In contrast, the conict between authorities is generally much less pronounced under both symmetric and
asymmetric output gap shocks. This means that the relative dierence between symmetric and asymmetric
shocks is much smaller than in the case of an ination shock. This is caused by the fact that, under an output
gap shock, there is no conict between policy-makers regarding the general orientation of stabilisation policies.
Instead, both authorities focus on suppressing output gap, albeit that, for the central bank, this is mainly
due to the intention of suppressing ination. In spite of having the same policy orientation, there remains
conict regarding the exact policy stance in the rst few periods after the shock. The disagreement concerns
the initial periods in the aftermath of a shock, which turn out to be crucial in determining the future shape of
output gap and ination dynamics. Consequently, all the players are much more active in the non-cooperative
regime under an output gap shock, than in the same regime under an ination shock. Put more simply, since
there is much more to gain, players engage more in stabilisation policies. As a result of this, the free-riding
eect that is so exposed under a symmetric ination shock is not visible under a symmetric output gap shock.
Under an asymmetric output gap shock, scal cooperation becomes protable for the country aected by the
shock w.r.t. non-cooperative regimes.
We extend the existing NK literature on policy coordination in a monetary union by considering not only
cases of non-coordination, scal cooperation and the grand coalition, but also partial cooperation arrange-
ments between scal players. We show that, in many cases, partial scal coordination of a subgroup of scal
players is more ecient, from the social point of view, than non-coordination. In other words, coordination
of scal policies is likely to be counter-productive when the coordinating group of countries is large enough,
thus increasing the conict with the central bank. However, when countries cooperate in smaller groups,
their policies are not completely symmetric, therefore there is less likely to be conict with the central bank,
since this only targets union averages.
3Note that in the extreme case of an asymmetric shock, i.e. when two countries in a (symmetric) monetary union are hit by
a completely anti-symmetric shock (one shock is exactly opposite to the other), both output gap and ination deviations will
also be in direct oposition. Consequently, the central bank will not react when the average ination and output gap remain the
same. An example of such an analysis can be found in Plasmans et al. (2006).
3As far as the social welfare is concerned, the grand coalition usually outperforms all the other arrange-
ments. In this context, it is interesting to study whether such a regime is feasible. From the individual
countries' perspective, the grand coalition seems barely possible because, in many cases, national govern-
ments incur higher losses when playing together with the central bank than when playing non-cooperatively.
An eective solution to this problem would be a scal federation similar to the US or at least an eective
transfer system. Unfortunately, due to various political reasons, it is doubtful that either of these will be pos-
sible in the near future. Similarly, although, from the social point of view, partial scal cooperation regimes
are, in general, superior to full scal cooperation or non-cooperation, they usually deliver poor results from
the perspective of individual players. This occurs especially in the case of asymmetric shocks, as the countries
directly aected by the shocks tend to "export" losses to the countries with whom they form a coalition.
Furthermore, we show that the common objective of the grand coalition is of utmost importance for the
outcome of the stabilisation process. If the distribution of bargaining power in the grand coalition does not
coincide with socially optimal preferences, this regime may turn out to be counter-productive w.r.t. a scal
coalition, thus an eective institutional design of cooperation between the governments and the central bank,
ought to take into account the fact that the central bank is outnumbered in any monetary union.
With our model, we perform extensive parameter sensitivity checks in several directions, i.e., among
others, w.r.t.: (i) structural parameters, (ii) policy rule parameters; (iii) preference parameters towards
output gap and ination (which is related to policy delegation analysis) and (iv) preference parameters
towards scal debt (which is related to the analysis of SGP stringency).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section gives a brief overview of the literature
on cyclical stabilisation in a monetary union and related issues. Section 3 outlines the model of a monetary
union whereas Section 4, following Beetsma et al. (2001), introduces an alternative concept of a social loss.
Section 5 presents results of numerical simulations and discussion. The last section concludes and proposes
directions of future research. An appendix containing sensitivity analysis, the derivation of the reduced form
of the model and the initial condition is available on-line at www.ua.ac.be/tomasz.michalak.4
2 Policy coordination in a monetary union
The inability of the common monetary policy to tackle country-specic shocks is generally considered to be
the single and most important macroeconomic cost of monetary unication. As Beetsma et al. (2001) point
out, the size of this cost depends on other mechanisms which may be helpful in adjusting to idiosyncratic
shocks.5 Unfortunately, factor markets (especially the labour market) are relatively immobile in Europe
and capital ows are limited (Buti, 2001a). Consequently, these two basic mobility mechanisms, which play
an important role in the US economy, are rather dysfunctional in the EMU case.6 This means that, the
stabilisation burden in the case of country specic shocks should be placed on other policies. One such policy
is the federal tax-transfer system; another mechanism that is vital to the US state-specic adjustments (see
von Hagen, 1999 and Melitz and Zumer, 1998). Also, in the EU framework, tax-transfers already take place,
however, in spite of public perception, the amounts of funds transferred are limited and are related to the
long-term economic development, rather than to short and medium term conditions. A deeper tax-system
integration, which may be able to address idiosyncratic shocks, seems to be politically implausible in the
EMU, at least in the near future.7 In the light of this, the national scal policy is considered to be the most
important instrument left to policymakers.8 In theory, this policy might be able to circumvent the problem
of country specic shocks in the euro-zone. However, whether the incurred cost of stabilisation via national
scal policies in a (relatively) integrated economic environment like the EMU is lower than the benets,
4http://www.ua.ac.be/download.aspx?c=tomasz.michalak&n=42902&ct=43348&e=169681
5It should also be noted that from the macroeconomic perspective the real cost of accessing a monetary union is reected by
the shadow cost of the abandonment of an own monetary policy so that it cannot be used as an adjustment tool in the case of an
idiosyncratic shock. In other words, the cost of entering the union depends, to a large extent, on the eectiveness of the national
central bank to tackle idiosyncratic shocks. It is especially important in the environment of closely integrated economies, like
the EU, and in the case of small countries, such as Belgium.
6See, for instance, Pierdzioch (2004) who presents a dynamic general equilibrium two-country optimizing sticky-price model
to analyze the consequences of international nancial market integration for the propagation of asymmetric productivity shocks
in the EMU.
7The issue of scal transfers within the EMU has been studied by a number of authors such as van Aarle et al. (2004),
Kletzer and von Hagen (2000) or Evers (2006). The latter considers direct transfers among private sectors and indirect transfers
among national scal authorities showing relative eciency of such solutions.
8Already Kenen (1969) emphasized the possible role which scal policies might play in a monetary union as potential chock-
adjustment mechanisms.
4remains to be answered, especially since spillovers from national scal policies may be counteractive w.r.t.
each other and lead to suboptimal outcomes. Another closely related problem is the response of a common
monetary authority which will react to national scal policies. Such a reaction can be counteractive as the
objectives of scal and monetary policies tend to be dissimilar. All of these issues warrant a discussion on
the protability and feasibility of policy coordination in a monetary union.
Aside from certain institutional issues, such as the eectiveness of enforcing the cooperation agreement,
protability of any coordination arrangement depends on the nature of the shock, i.e. whether it is symmetric
or asymmetric, ination or output gap, etc. In the case of symmetric shocks, policy coordination was
traditionally considered to be benecial because it internalised externalities emerging from individual policies
(as recently argued by Uhlig, 2003 and Plasmans et al., 2006a). In particular, the usual argument in favour
of international policy coordination is based on direct positive demand spillovers. In contrast to this, more
recent micro-founded models of the EMU tend to conclude in favour of negative scal spillovers by emphasising
the adverse terms-of-trade eects of balanced-budget foreign scal expansion on the domestic economy. For
example, should governments perceive negative spillovers from other countries, they would reconsider a non-
cooperative (\beggar-thy-neighbour") policy in response to bad economic shocks and would agree on a more
restrictive stance in all countries.9 Conversely, should governments perceive positive spillovers, coordination
should eliminate free-riding behaviour of individual countries and promote a more expansionary policy in
response to some economic shocks. Evidently, incentives for scal policy coordination in a monetary union are
directly linked to the sizes and signs of the spillovers resulting from national scal policies. Fiscal spillovers
are crucial, since they ultimately determine whether coordination should lead to a more expansionary or a
more restrictive scal stance in the member states.
Other arguments in favour of coordination are that (see e.g. Hughes Hallett and Ma, 1986): (i) it restores
policy eectiveness; (ii) speeds up an economy's response to policy actions; and (iii) enables to exploit
comparative policy advantages.
In contrast to the above traditional arguments, more recent works question the protability of policy
coordination. The seminal paper of Beetsma et al. (2001) shows that policy coordination in a monetary union
can be counter-productive in the case of a symmetric shock, which as Buti (2001a) notes, 'turns conventional
wisdom on its head'.10 Their model emphasises the conict between governments and the central bank
which share the stabilisation burden.11 According to their argument, the coordination of budgetary stance
between countries in the union makes scal policy more eective, thus governments are more willing to accept
changes in their decits. In other words, cooperation increases the use of scal policies. This, in turn, has
important consequences on the behaviour of the CB, which, generally has objectives dierent from those
of scal policymakers. More specically, in the case of a negative demand shock, both scal and monetary
authorities are interested in stabilising output, which, from the central bank's point of view, is a means of
stabilising ination. Since cooperating scal authorities are eager to bear more stabilisation burden, the
(non-cooperating) central bank free-rides on their eorts and does not loosen monetary policy as much as
when governments do not collude. In contrast, supply shocks make output and ination move in opposite
directions. The stronger scal response encouraged by cooperation exacerbates the conict between price
and output stability and, therefore, between monetary and scal authorities. As a result of this, the central
bank is more restrictive when governments cooperate, compared to when governments participate in the
non-cooperative regime. In other words, for both types of shocks, scal coordination may turn out to be
counter-productive, albeit for dierent reasons. Following the same rationale, Beetsma et al. (2001) argue
that scal cooperation may be benecial in the case of a country-specic shock. The free-riding of (or the
conict with) the central bank can largely be avoided as the monetary authority is interested in aggregate
ination (and possibly, to some extent, an aggregate output). In this respect, the reaction of the monetary
authority to idiosyncratic shock is limited.
Lombardo and Sutherland (2004) conrm some ndings of Beetsma et al. (2001) by showing, in a
9One country attempts to improve its output-ination trade-o by running a "beggar-thy-neighbour" policy. This is followed
by the reaction of another country(-ies) and the resulting non-cooperative outcome is a deationary bias with all countries worse
o with regard to a cooperative situation in which each country takes care of domestic ination without attempting to aect
the exchange rate (Cooper, 1985).
10It should be noted that prior to Beetsma et al. (2001), it has been observed in empirical studies (see e.g. Neck et al., 1999)
that coordination does not necessarily lead to superior results as a result of either time-inconsistency and/or coalition formation
of the scal policymakers against the monetary authority (see also next footnote). Furthemore, Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998)
show that scal coordination may a negative inuence on a tax and public spending discipline, i.e. they may reduce the positive
eects of monetary unication.
11Rogo (1985) already stated that there is a potential for a negative impact of coordination among a subset of actors (in this
case the two scal authorities, leaving out the common centra bank).
5micro-founded model, that scal coordination is advantageous when country-specic shocks are negatively
correlated. This study also suggests that the best results are delivered by an appropriate mix of both scal
and monetary instruments.
Other works defend the view of desirability of policy coordination. Von Hagen and Mundschenk (2003)
argue that, in the long run, there is little need for coordination, however, in the short term, there are
substantial gains from scal cooperation. Furthermore, if the central bank also pursues a goal of output
stabilisation, the grand coalition of all the authorities together is advisable. Buti et al. (2001b), Engwerda
et al. (2002), Beetsma and Jensen (2004) and Kirsanova et al. (2007) also support the active role of scal
policy in stabilisation.
Cavallari and Di Gioacchino (2004), in the framework of a two-country static model, show that coordi-
nation of scal policies can only reduce output and ination volatility w.r.t. the non-cooperative regime in
the case of a demand shock, and that it can be potentially counter-productive otherwise. This adverse eect
of union-wide coordinated scal measures can be circumvented by "global coordination", i.e. grand coali-
tion. In more complex micro-founded general equilibrium models, Gal  and Monacelli (2005b) and Beetsma
and Jensen (2004, 2005) also consider the case for scal and monetary policies' coordination. Specically,
Beetsma and Jensen (2005) extend the framework developed by Benigno (2001) and develop an NK two-
country monetary union model whereby national scal authorities pursue active stabilisation policies using
public spending. Their model reveals that the relative advantage of using scal stabilisation policy is un-
changed when the correlation of the supply shocks decreases. However, from a welfare point of view, the
use of scal policy for the purpose of stabilisation appears to be of relevance. Beetsma and Jensen (2005)
argue that the governments should be active in situations in which a restriction on scal policy in order to
equalise this policy with its natural level leads to welfare losses being equivalent to a permanent reduction
in consumption of the order from 0.5 to 1 percentage point. A similar view is shared by Gal  and Monacelli
(2005b) who argue in favour of active scal policies.
In addition to cooperative scenarios, Forlati (2007) focuses on a non-cooperative regime showing that,
in such a situation, the central bank does not stabilise the average monetary union ination as it has to
accommodate the distortions caused by non-cooperative national governments. At the same time, the non-
existence of an agreement between countries calls for an active scal stance, even in case of symmetric shocks.
In addition, there are a number of more empirically oriented studies concerning issues related to policy
coordination in a monetary union. Westaway (2003) shows that discretionary policy can be much more
benecial than Taylor type scal rules. Weyerstrass et al. (2006) present an extensive empirical study of
policy coordination in the EMU in the context of scal spillovers and they strongly advocate the case for
scal cooperation. Semmler and Zhang (2004) focus on scal policies and show that the non-Ricardian scal
policy has been pursued in France and Germany in the rst years of the EMU. Moreover, they nd that
scal and monetary policies in France and Germany have been counteractive and do not accommodate to
each other (in the years prior to 1999). Using VAR analysis, Giuliodori and Beetsma (2005) explore the
trade spillover eects caused by scal policies in Europe and conclude that monetary unication in Europe
had caused a "slight strenghtening on average of the cross-country spillovers from a scal expansion". This
indicates that policy coordination might be increasingly benecial in the euro-zone.
Most of the initial works (like the static model of Beetsma et al., 2001) were tractable enough to deliver
analytical solutions. However, the much more complex dynamic general equilibrium modelling with a higher
number of cooperation arrangements require resorting to numerical methods. These were used in Beetsma
and Jensen (2004, 2005), van Aarle et al. (2002a, 2002b) and Plasmans et al. (2006a), among others, and
will also be applied in this paper.
3 A multi-country NKOEM model of a monetary union
During recent years the theoretical and empirical research in NK macroeconomics has been extended steadily
and produced a whole new series of results and insights about the workings of the macroeconomy. Essentially,
the starting point of the NK approach is the explicit derivation of macroeconomic relationships from under-
lying microeconomic foundations. This principle is shared with New Classical macroeconomics, although
the former includes a great deal of imperfections in the goods and labour markets. The NK approach now
constitutes the core of the macroeconomic paradigm world-wide.
Our modelling objective is to cast the New-Keynesian model of a monetary union in the LQDG framework
in order to analyse strategic interactions between a comparatively large number of players. By denition,
LQDGs concern continuous-time models but, unfortunately, the vast majority of NK/NOEM models were
6constructed in the discrete-time framework. Notable exceptions are Buiter (2004), Linnemann (2002), Ben-
habib et al. (2001), Kirsanova et al. (2006). However, with the exception of the last one, all these are
single economy models, thus would obviously require extensions to allow them to be applied to a monetary
union setting.12 In line with this, our strategy will be to transform a discrete-time NK model of a monetary
union into its continuous-time counterpart. This methodology is also convenient from the point of view of
model parametrisation as most of the empirical studies useful for calibration purposes, concern discrete-time
models. The second important modelling issue is the computational complexity of a LQDG, which grows
with the number of dynamic equations of the model and/or the number of players. Having this in mind, we
aim to describe every country in a monetary union in a manner as concise as possible. In fact, as explained
in Svensson (1997) and Ball (1999), short-term macrodynamics can be analysed using a relatively simple
system consisting of an AD curve showing the evolution of the output gap driven by the real interest rate
(see e.g. Woodford, 2003), and a Phillips curve describing the dynamics of ination. Despite its relative sim-
plicity, such models have been widely used to understand the basic mechanisms of macroeconomic policies.
Consequently, our multi-country monetary union model will consist of as many AD equations as countries,
as many Phillips curves as countries, and a number of real exchange rate relationships.
Due to space constraints, we will refrain from deriving the NK model of a monetary union from micro-
foundations. Instead, we will refer to results from various studies in the literature. Let scal and monetary
players from a set N be divided in two groups: n countries i (i 2 F) and one central bank b (b = B; with
N = F [ B). Following, among others, Lind e et al. (2004), aggregate demand (AD) equations are:13
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where Et is an expectation operator at time t; yi;t; pj;t; i;t; fi;t; sij;t := pj;t   pi;t denote output gap, price
level, ination, scal policy in country i and real exchange rate (competitiveness) between countries i and j;
respectively, whereas iU;t denotes union-wide common nominal interest rate. All parameters are non-negative.
The current output gap in country i depends positively on the expected output gap, the past output gap,
real interest rate, government's scal decit, dynamics of other countries' output gaps and competitiveness,
dened as a dierence of respective price levels. Finally, v
y
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independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) error term. This functional form of the AD equation may
be obtained from a linearised model of optimisation behavior on the part of consumers, in particular, from
the resulting Euler equation, in which consumption is replaced with output gap, as shown, for instance, in
Lind e et al. (2004). Interia term (1   i;y)yi;t 1 reects so-called "habit formation" in consumption (see for
example Smets and Wouters, 2002 or Plasmans et al., 2006b), which measures the sluggishness of households
in changing their choices over time. Foreign output gap and competitiveness elements in (1) reect the
economic linkages between countries. In particular, the rst one is a trade channel, where, intuitively, higher
foreign output gaps contribute to higher domestic output gaps as a result of increased import. Similarly,
domestic export increases when a foreign price level becomes higher than the domestic one. The forward-
looking and backward-looking dynamics of foreign output gap and competitiveness spillovers result from
habit formation in consumption and have a similar form as the dynamics of domestic output gaps in the AD
equations.14 From the strategic point of view, the AD equation delivers an intuitive argument in favour of
monetary and scal policy coordination. Basically, both authorities actually target the same variable (i.e.
output gap) in (1), thus coordination seems to be a natural choice. As Lambertini and Rovelli (2003) rightly
note:
12There are two countries in the model developed by Kirsanova et al. (2006) but this particular framework becomes compu-
tationally dicult when we add another, third country.
13By F=i we denote the set of all countries except for country i:
14In this respect, we refer to Lind e et al. (2004) who develop a small open economy model which features habit formation
resulting in the reported dynamics of international economic linkages in the AD curve (see eq. 2.24 in Lind e et al. 2004),
imperfect nancial integration, and gradual exchange rate pass-through. As imperfect nancial integration and gradual exchange
rate pass-through are irrelevant in the model of a (closed) monetary union with a common interest rate, we will put them aside.
Consequently, the Lind e et al. (2004) model can be boiled down to ve main equations: (i) aggregate demand/IS curve, (ii) an
aggregate supply curve, (iii) monetary, and (iv) scal policy rules; and (v) competitiveness relationships.
7"This is of immediate concern for both policymakers, no matter whether they consider aggregate demand
(or the output gap) as an argument in their objective function (as will be generally the case for scal author-
ities) or only as an intermediate variable in the policy-transmission mechanism (as would be the exclusive
concern of ination nutter-type central banker)".
The second set of equations in our model are New-Keynesian Phillips curves, which relate ination to
cyclical activity. In the New-Keynesian model, these are derived from optimising rms' price-setting decisions
subject to constraints on the frequency of price adjustment. We assume Phillips curves of the form:










where we follow various studies in the literature allowing for some degree of price inertia for 0 < i; < 1.15
In case i; = 1 equation (2) becomes the pure forward-looking NK Phillips Curve employed, for instance,
in Clarida et al. (1999) or Chapter 3 of Woodford (2003). In contrast, when i; = 0 the pure backward-
looking aggregate supply equation emerges (the, so called, "accelerationists" Phillips-Curve) which is studied,
for instance, in Kirsanova et al. (2005).16 The exact form of our Phillips curve with foreign price spillover
was derived by Lind e et al. (2004, see eq. 2.47). Ination shock v
i;t in (2) is an independent, exogenous,
stationary, zero mean AR(1) shock dened analogically to v
y
i;t with dumping parameter  i; and error term

i . In the context of our model, these shocks should be interpreted as cost-push shocks (for instance, oil
shocks in the 1970s), whereas the shocks in output equations (1), v
y
i;t, should be interpreted as demand
shocks, for instance, changes in consumer preferences, etc.17.
For n countries there are as many as n(n   1) competitiveness relationships sij, however, as shown in the
on-line Appendix, it is possible to rewrite all of them only in terms of s1j;t := pj;t   p1;t where j 2 F=1:
s1j;t+1 = s1j;t + j;t+1   1;t+1; (3)
which are only n   1 dynamic equations.
In his seminal work, Taylor (1995) demonstrated that actual US monetary policy could be described by a
simple rule that relates the real interest rate to ination and to output gap. This relationship became known
as the (monetary) Taylor rule. In the monetary union case, the Taylor rule of the central bank might be
written in the form:
iU;t = U




i=1 !ii;t is the average union ination and yU;t :=
Pn
i=1 !iyi;t is the average union output
gap with parameter !i indicating the relative weight of country i in a monetary union (
n P
i=1
!i = 1):18 The
rst term in the Taylor rule shows that the central bank responds to the rise in average ination with a more
restrictive monetary policy in order to weaken demand across the union. This, in turn, should hinder the
growth in ination. The second term shows that the real interest rate is also raised if output rises as this
indicates a future ination acceleration.
Taylor (2000) also points out that scal policy can be approximated by a policy rule (for further discussion




In this paper we extend the above denition of both rules so that:
15See, among others Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Section 4 model of Gali and Getler (1999), Chapter 3, Section 3.2 model of
Woodford (2003), Lind e et al. (2004, where two backward-looking lags are allowed), Evans and McGough (2005), or Plasmans
et al. (2006b).
16More on this type of the Phillips Curve can be found in Friedman (1968) and Mortensen (1970). For a recent discussion of
dierent types of a Phillips curve see  Olafsson (2006).
17The shock v
y
i;t should not to be interpreted as a (positive) technological shock as it leads to increased and not decreased
ination.
18For a similar formulation of the monetary policy rule in a model of a monetary union see van Aarle et al. (2004).
8~ {U;t = iU;t +^ {U;t = U
 U;t + U
y yU;t +^ {U;t; and (6)
~ fi;t = fi;t + ^ fi;t = i
i;t + i
yyt + ^ fi;t; (7)
where ^ fi;t and ^ {U;t are control variables of the players in the LQDG and denote deviations of the scal decit
and nominal common interest rate from (4) and (5), respectively. In particular, as Taylor (2000) argues, a
simple scal rule can be used to explain most uctuations in scal decits. The starting point of his analysis
is the division of the scal decit into a cyclical component and a structural component. The rst part
can be interpreted as the systematic response of scal policy to output uctuations (the so-called automatic
stabilisers); the second part contains structural and discretionary components of scal policy. In our case,
the standard Taylor scal rule i
i;t + i
yyt is to be interpreted as an automatic stabiliser, whereas ^ fi;t is
a discretionary component. For the monetary Taylor rule ^ {U;t is the discretional component of the central
bank's policy.
The interpretation of the above policy rules in our setting is closely related to the assumptions of the
LQDG. In particular, we assume the so-called open-loop information structure, which means that (i) every
player knows at time t 2 [0;1) just the initial state, and the model structure; and (ii) the set of admissible
control actions are functions of time, where time runs from zero to innity. This scenario can be interpreted
as the players simultaneously determining their actions and submiting them to some authority who then
enforces these plans as binding commitments.19 Thus, this follows the same procedure of the policies under
commitment as assumed in, for instance, Beetsma and Jensen (2005) in the case of optimal commitment
policy. In reality, optimal commitment policies are dicult to enforce and maintain as players usually
have incentives to unilaterally deviate from initially agreed strategies. Instead, it is argued that, although
policy rules also require commitment, it is easier to control whether they are followed, especially when their
structure is simple and deviations can easily be detected.20 Our setting contains features of both approaches
as we consider commitment to optimal deviations from the pre-set policy rules. This might be interpreted
as a situation where both scal and monetary authorities announce to the public that they follow certain
policy rules. However, facing the shock they agree to deviate from pre-announced rules and stick to this
commitment throughout the stabilisation process. The cost of the deviations from the rule is, thus, the loss
of public/nancial markets' condence. The further this deviation goes, the more noticeable and risky it
becomes, therefore the quadratic form of the loss function is especially appealing in this case. There is still
an unanswered question related to the commitment, as according to the open-loop information structure, the
participating parties are not able to react to each other's policies once the stabilisation period has started.
Such reactions are plausible due to usual free-riding incentives of individual players. Thus, alternatively,
it could be assumed that the planned deviations from the rules are made public. On the one hand, scal
and monetary authorities are "punished" by deviating from the policy rules as embodied in the quadratic
loss function. On the other hand, the public supervision guarantees, to some extent, that commitments are
obeyed, thus facilitating the open-loop information structure. Naturally, the closed-loop assumption, where
players may discretionally change their policies during the stabilisation process, would be more preferable.
However, at present, there are no algorithms available to solve a multi-player case of the closed-loop LQDG.21
Thus, more analytically and computationally tractable open-loop LQDGs are an interesting benchmark to
ascertain how much parties can gain by playing various (albeit pre-committed) strategies.
In order to reduce the number of equations, it is convenient to substitute iU;t and fi;t in (1) with (4)
and (5). The resulting system consists of n AD curves (1), n Philips curves (2), and n   1 competitiveness
equations, which, together with shock AR processes, constitute a hybrid (forward- and backward-looking)
Stochastic NK Model (SNKM henceforth) of a closed monetary union. All the necessary steps to cast this
model into the LQDG framework are described in the on-line Appendix (Subsection A5.1).










i (t) + iy2
i (t) + i ^ f2
i (t)ge (t t0)dt; (8)
19For more details on the LQDG see Engwerda (2005).
20As Beetsma and Jensen (2005, footnote 4) note, Svensson (2003) strongly disagrees with this view, arguing that "optimizing
behaviour implying targeting rules (essentially the rst-order conditions resulting from optimization) is more transparent."
21An analysis about the interaction of monetary and scal policies with a feedback information structure may be found in
van Aarle et al. (2001), however, only for a model with 2 players.
9for i = 1;2;:::;n, where i; i; i indicate scal players' relative preferences concerning deviations of national












U(t) + CB^ {2(t)ge (t t0)dt; (9)
where U and U indicate the central bank's relative preferences concerning deviations of ination, output
gap and interest rate in the MU as a whole.
Finally, a notion of cooperation should be more formally dened in our LQDG framework. Lambertini and
Rovelli (2003, p.1) list the following forms of coordination between macroeconomic policymakers: (1) exchange
of information; (2) mutual acknowledgment of the existence and probable behaviour of the other policy
makers; (3) joint-policy making (full cooperation, i.e. collusion); and (4) agreement on a sequence of moves
between the two authorities. In our framework, a cooperation between any group of players encompasses all
the above elements and means that all players involved in a coalition minimise the joint loss, which is dened
as the weighted sum of individual losses. A disjoint and exhaustive division of all the players in the game
into coalitions will be called a coalition structure (and abbreviated ).
Apart from the open-loop information structure discussed above, there are two additional crucial assump-
tions related to the LQDG considered in this paper:23
1. We consider an innite planning horizon; however, the future is discounted with a non-zero parameter 
every period. We assume that the matrix pairs ( ~ A  1
2I; ~ Bi); where ~ Bi is a submatrix of ~ B concerning
control instruments of player i, are stabilizable. This formalises the assumption that, in principle, each
player is able to stabilise the system on his own, taking into account his discounting perception; and
2. It might happen that our LQDG has more than one open-loop Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately, neither
control theory nor economic theory gives a clear-cut answer as to which equilibrium would be chosen
in such a case. Obviously, Pareto-dominated equilibria can be disregarded; however, there is no other
similar objective criterion, which could be justied in the environment of self-oriented players. In such
a situation, we assume that the equilibrium is chosen following the (standard) social optimum criterion,
i.e. the equilibrium characterised by the lowest sum of losses is searched for.24
4 Social loss





Ji(t0) + JCB(t0); (10)
where Ji(t0) and JCB(t0) are dened by loss functions (8) and (9), respectively, and  is a cooperation
regime in which the combined loss is computed. Whereas the above denition seems to be plausible for a
two-country model, it is not appealing in more complex settings. Since, in a general formulation of our model,
there are n countries in the union and only one central bank, the relative importance of monetary instrument
in JU(t0;) gets smaller with increasing n: It is rather dicult to see the rationale behind it as the relative
cost related to the interest rate volatility should be irrelevant of the size of the union.25 To circumvent the
above concerns, we follow the approach of Beetsma et al. (2001) and propose our own MU loss function of
the form:
22Since the seminal works of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), the quadratic loss functions are
commonly used in the literature on strategic behaviour of scal and monetary authorities. See also Schellekens and Chadha
(1999) for a more recent analysis supporting the quadratic form of the loss function.
23For more details see Engwerda (2005).
24The social optimum can be dened in various ways. For isntance, in the next section we propose a new denition of a social
optimum for a monetary union case. For the other example see Beetsma et al. (2001).
25Formula (10) applied to the 50-State US and to the 13-Member State EMU would show that (ceteris paribus) the relative
importance of interest rate volatility for the American economy is much lower than for the Euro-zone.
10CS Long notation Acronym Description
1 [C1jC2jC3jCB] or [1j2j3j4] N non-cooperative regime
2 [C1;C2;C3;CB] or [1234] C the grand coalition
3 [C1;C2;C3jCB] or [123j4] F full scal cooperation
4 [C1;C2jC3jCB] or [12j3j4] P (or 4) partial scal cooperation
5 [C1;C3jC2jCB] or [13j2j4] P (or 5) partial scal cooperation
6 [C1jC2C3jCB] or [1j23j4] P (or 6) partial scal cooperation












i (t) + U^ y2





+ r;U b ^ {U
2
(t)e (t t0)dt; (11)
where U; U, f;U and r;U are preference parameters of the society concerning deviations of ination,
output gap and both types of control instruments. Averages of variables' squares instead of squares of
variables' averages guarantee that negative deviations of inations and output gaps do not cancel out with
positive ones. Furthermore, taking into account the average value of scal control instruments across an MU
guarantees that volatility of interest rate is well represented in the loss (as it corresponds to its actual relative
importance in a single economy).
Whether J
U(t0;) is smaller, equal or greater than JU(t0;) depends largely on the preference parameters
in loss functions (8-9) and (11). In a basic case when all these preferences coincide, i.e. i = CB = U;
i = CB = U and i = CB = f;U = r;U, it is trivial to show that the (more) conventional social loss
JU(t0;) will always be higher than J
U(t0;) irrelevant of ^ i; ^ yi; b ^ fi and ^ {U adjustment paths. Otherwise, the
result of this comparison is case dependent. In particular, it may vary with the type of the shock considered.
The formula in (11) is similar to the one proposed by Beetsma et al. (2001); however, we extended the
denition of cross monetary union loss with the deviation of the interest rate, as this is an important factor
inuencing the welfare of the representative citizen in each country.
Such coalition structures for which J
U(t0;) is the lowest will be called social optima and will be denoted
by SOP: Similarly, those regimes that are characterised by the conventional lowest loss JU(t0;) will be
denoted by SOP: It is straightforward to show that, in the LQDG framework considered in this paper,
a coalition composed of all the players in the game (i.e. the grand coalition) always belongs to a set of
social optima SOP (for more details on this issue see Plasmans et al. 2006a, Chapter 2). However, as
the denition of J
U(t0;) is not necessarily based on the same players' preferences as those used in the
optimisation process, the grand coalition does not necessarily belong to SOP: This will be evident from
various numerical simulations presented in the subsequent section.
5 Numerical simulations
For clarity and space concerns we will focus our simulations on the three-country application of the model
from Section 3. This number is sucient to consider partial cooperation between scal authorities but
still small enough to be computationally tractable. Furthermore, throughout this article we assume that
cooperation between the central bank and only a subgroup of countries is not allowed, which yields 6 feasible
coalition structures listed in Table 1. C1, C2 and C3 and CB denote governments within the union and the
central bank, respectively.
5.1 Parametrisation
Table 2 lists all the parameters of the benchmark model. In the baseline scenario (denoted sc1), countries
are assumed to be symmetric with respect to all 7 structural parameters.
The parameters listed in Table 2 are comparable to other simulation studies, in particular, van Aarle et
al. (2004), Batini and Haldane (1999) and Leith and Wren-Lewis (2001). When calibrating the IS equation
with both backward- and forward-looking behaviour for the UK, they assumed i;y equal to 0.8 and 0.9,
11Structural parameters:
i;=y = 2=3 i = 0:5 i = 0:75 ij = 0:5 ij = 0:25
 = 0:99 i = 0:06 &ij = 0:5
Policy rules parameters:
i
y =  0:5 i
 = 0 U
y = 0:5 U
 = 1:5
Preference parameters:
i = 0:02 i = i=5 i = 0:1 U = 0:02 U = 0:02
CB;i = CB;i=5 CB;i = 0:02 CB;i = 0:1 f;U = r;U = 0:1
Table 2: Baseline parameters (i;j 2 f1;2;3g;i 6= j)
respectively, which are plausible values for quarterly data. For an average EMU economy we set this value to
be 2/3 in the benchmark model, however, we will pay special attention to this parameter in our sensitivity
analysis. McCallum (2001), for the US case, suggests that for the interest rate elasticity of output in the IS
curve (i in our model), a value of 0.4 is more appropriate than Rotemberg and Woodford's (1999) value of
0.6 or McCallum and Nelson's (1999) value of 0.2. However, Cecchetti et al. (2002) estimates its average
value to be 0.7 in the EU. In our case it is assumed that i = 0:5 which is the value in between the above
studies and, for example, corresponds to the parametrisation of Batini and Haldane (1999). In the sensitivity
analysis both lower and higher values of this parameter will be considered.
The scal multiplier (i) measures the impact of changes in scal decit on output gap and is estimated
by the European Commission (2001, 2002) in the framework of the Commission's QUEST model and the
OECD's Interlink model. The rst simulations suggest an average value of 0.6 (0:1) in the EU countries
while second ones yield values of 0.6 in France, 0.9 in Italy, 1.0 in Germany and the UK, and 1.3 in the
US. The dierence is to be attributed to the forward-looking nature of the rst model. Having these values
in mind, we assume i to be equal to 0.75. Parameters ij measure the elasticity of domestic import w.r.t.
foreign output gap and is estimated to equal on average to 0.4 for the EU countries (Equipe MIMOSA, 1996)
and ca. 0.35 for Sweden by Lind e et al. (2004). We follow van Aarle et al. (2004) and assume the value of
0.5, which implies relative high trade integration of the economies in a monetary union. This regards also
the competitiveness parameter ij that is set to 0:25:
There is no consensus in the literature regarding ination persistence in the Phillips-curve. It is generally
recognised that backward-looking element plays an important role in this equation, but various empirical
studies deliver dierent estimates of i;: Whereas Gali and Gertler (1999) and Benigno and Lopez-Salido
(2002) nd a predominantly forward-looking specication of the Phillips curve (i; around 0.7 for Germany,
0.64 for France, 0.4 for Italy, etc.), Mehra (2004) nds a predominantly backward-looking specication (i;
around 0.1). Furthermore, Mankiw (2001) argues that stylised empirical facts are inconsistent with the
predominantly forward-looking Phillips Curve. In the benchmark we assume the same value of i; as i;y
i.e. 0.66 but we will consider dierent specications later. The elasticity of ination w.r.t. the output gap
is an important parameter of the Philips Curve as it ultimately determines short-run adjustment between
ination and output gap. McCallum and Nelson (1999) and Gal  and Monacelli (2005a) assume this value
to be 0.3, Batini and Haldane (1999), 0.2, Leith and Wren-Lewis (2001) for the UK and Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999) for the US set this value to be 0.1, where as Beetsma and Jensen (2005) choose the value of
0.04. Furthermore, Lind e et al. (2004) estimates it to be at most 0.0158 for the Swedish economy. Again, we
choose the value in between the above values setting i = 0:06; however, it will be one of the main parameters
on which we are going to focus our sensitivity check. Gagnon and Ihrig (2002) estimate the import price
pass-through parameter (i  &ij in our model) to be between 0.05 and 0.23 for most OECD countries. On
the other hand, Lind e et al. (2004) estimates this value for a Swedish economy to be smaller than 0.003. We
calibrate this value to be 0.03, i.e. &ij = 0:5:
Structural model parameters are assumed to be symmetric, however, policymakers' preferences are not.
The central bank's preferences dier from those of the (identical) national governments. As it is common in
the literature (see, for instance, Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1998, Dixit and Lambertini, 2001, Uhlig, 2003 or
Engwerda et al., 2002), we assume that the central bank puts a larger weight on ination stabilisation than
on output-gap stabilisation. In contrast, scal players are more concerned with output-gap stabilisation than
with ination stabilisation. Moreover, as laid down in the Maastricht Treaty, the central bank's objectives
concern aggregate output and ination in the MU while the scal players are only concerned about own
output and ination. Parameter U is often regarded as a (counter proportional) measure of the central
bank independence and it is argued, that a fully independent central bank should be concerned only about
12ination, i.e. CB = 0:26 In the benchmark we do not take such a restrictive position and we assume that
the central bank is 5 times more concerned about ination than about an output gap, however, CB is still
positive. Fiscal authorities, in turn, are 5 times more concerned about output gap than about ination. Thus,
calibrated preferences appear to be the most appropriate in our model as they guarantee that no variable is
overrepresented in the total loss of any player.27 For the social loss function J
U(t0); it is assumed that society
should be concerned about the output gap as much as the government is, whereas it should be concerned
about ination as much as the central bank is. Hence, U = CB = 5i and U = i = 5CB: The preference
parameters of control instruments are set the same as in loss functions (8-9), i.e. i = CB = f;U = r;U.
As far as both policy rules are concerned, for the monetary rule, we assume the parametrisation originally
proposed by Taylor (1993a, 1993b) for the US, i.e.: U
 = 1:5 and U
y = 0:5. For the scal policy rule, we
assume that i
y =  0:5; which is the value found for the sensitivity of the scal decit in relation to the
cyclical variation by the European Commission (2001) for the Euro-area. It is used, for instance, in the
simulations of Aarle et al. (2004). Furthermore, i
 = 0. The value of a discount factor  = 0:01 in the
loss functions (8-9) is coherent with the assumed structural discount parameter  = 0:99; which implies a
1% (steady-state) real rate of return on a quarterly basis. Finally, in the benchmark, we assume symmetric
bargaining power in every coalition, i.e. C1=C2=C3 = CB = 1
4 in the grand coalition, C1=C2=C3 = 1
3 in the
scal coalition under F; and C1 = C2 = 1
2; C1 = C3 = 1
2; and C2 = C3 = 1
2 in regimes 4;5; and 6;
respectively.
Numerical simulations are performed using numerical toolbox to solve the N-player ane LQ open-loop
dierential games presented in Engwerda et al. (2008).
5.2 Ination shocks
The rst four rows of Table 3 contain the (optimal) welfare losses in the various coalitional arrangements for










The next two rows show social losses JU and J
U whereas, in the rest of the table, a decomposition of players'
losses into constituting elements is presented.29 Reporting ination, output gap and instrument shares in the
the total loss aims to provide additional intuition for our results.
As mentioned before, the grand coalition C is always a standard social optimum SOP in the LQDG
framework. In this particular case this regime constitutes also social optimum as in SOP: For every
coalition structure, J
U(t0) is approximately two times smaller than JU(t0) which is caused by the following
two reasons: (i) J
U(t0) contains only averages of ination, output gap and scal debt deviations whereas
JU(t0) is composed of nominal values; (ii) JU(t0) includes additionally the loss of the central bank from
output and ination. For some combinations of preference parameters it could be theoretically possible to
obtain J
U(t0) > JU(t0) but this condition would hold only in an extreme case.
In general, the structural symmetry of the model, the symmetry of scal players' preferences and the
shocks make all the scal players' losses to be the same in the N, C and F regimes. Naturally, this symmetry
is broken up under partial scal cooperation. The decomposition of losses shows that in nominal terms
squared ination deviation over time is about 5 times higher than squared output gap deviation over time.
That is why ination deviation contributes to the total scal loss as much as output gap deviation, even
though scal players care 5 times less about ination than about output gap. This observation validates our
choice of benchmark weights in the loss functions.30
Regarding the form of the AD curve and the comment of Lambertini and Rovelli (2003), quoted in
Subsection 2, that both types of authorities target the same variable, it is interesting to note that, in our
dynamic setting, there is no straightforward relationship between changes in total volatility of output and
changes in total volatility of ination. Intuitively, we would expect that, since the volatility of ination is
directly linked with volatility of output gap via the Phillips Curve just as the volatility of output gap is
26This opinion was also expressed by Lars Svensson at the conference "Ination Targeting, Central Bank Independence and
Transparency", 15-16 June 2007, Trinity College, Camridge.
27This issue will be discussed further in this section.
28All (optimal) losses are multiplied by the factor 103:
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dt in the lower part of the table.
30More conventional preferences in which scal authorities care only two times as much about output gap as about ination
will be studied later on in this paper.
13(sc1;v
0S) N C F [12j3j4] [13j2j4] [1j23j4]
C1 2.1948 2.1211 9.3016 2.5328 2.5328 1.7296
C2 2.1948 2.1211 9.3016 2.5328 1.7296 2.5328
C3 2.1948 2.1211 9.3016 1.7296 2.5328 2.5328
CB 6.2456 5.3308 21.843 5.6049 5.6049 5.6049
JU(t0) 12.830 11.694 49.748 12.400 12.400 12.400
J
U(t0) 7.1445 6.3675 29.934 6.6853 6.6853 6.6853
F;C1^ 2
C1 1.0782 0.8725 0.9979 0.9605 0.9605 0.9792
F;C1^ y2
C1 1.0880 1.0596 1.0612 1.3182 1.3182 0.7167
F;C1
c ^ f2
C1 0.0285 0.1890 7.2424 0.2541 0.2541 0.0336
F;C2^ 2
C2 1.0782 0.8725 0.9979 0.9605 0.9792 0.9605
F;C2^ y2
C2 1.0880 1.0596 1.0612 1.3182 0.7167 1.3182
F;C2
c ^ f2
C2 0.0285 0.1890 7.2424 0.2541 0.0336 0.2541
F;C3^ 2
C3 1.0782 0.8725 0.9979 0.9792 0.9605 0.9605
F;C3^ y2
C3 1.0880 1.0596 1.0612 0.7167 1.3182 1.3182
F;C3
c ^ f2
C3 0.0285 0.1890 7.2424 0.0336 0.2541 0.2541
CB^ 2
CB 5.3912 4.3627 4.9896 4.8337 4.8337 4.8337
CB^ y2
CB 0.2176 0.2119 0.2122 0.2181 0.2181 0.2181
CBb ^ {
2
U 0.6367 0.7561 16.641 0.5530 0.5530 0.5530
Table 3: Optimal losses for symmetric ination shock, baseline parametrisation
linked to the volatility of ination in the AD curve, the relationship between changes in the total loss of
both variables should be one-directional. In other words, diminished ination volatility would be related to
either diminished or increased output gap volatility only. However, in our relatively rich dynamic setting,
diminished (total) ination volatility can be associated both with decreased (total) volatility of output gap
(e.g. F;C1^ y2
C1 and F;C1^ 2
C1 in F vs. N) and with increased (total) volatility of output gap (e.g. F;C1^ y2
C1
and F;C1^ 2
C1 in [12j3j4] vs. N). Thus, it is clear that complex patterns of economic conditions can emerge
in our model, which emphasises the need for an accurate policy regime.
The dynamics of all relevant variables in regimes N; C and F is compared in Figure 1. Symmetric supply
side (positive) ination shocks cause output gap to decline which urges expansionary scal policies in all
countries. In contrast, the central bank reacts to positive ination by increasing interest rates. Thus, there
is an obvious policy conict between scal and monetary authorities. From decomposed losses in Table 3 we
see that in the non-cooperative regime N there is a strong free-riding eect compared to the grand coalition
regime C; which results from the positive scal spillovers characterising our setting.31 When authorities do
not cooperate, each of them tries to free-ride on the others' stabilisation eorts. The same phenomenon
occurs in Beetsma et al. (2001) as their model also features positive scal spillovers. Consequently, all the
authorities do not stabilise economy strongly enough and the output gap and ination deviations under regime
N are comparatively high. This results, for instance, in the following total loss for scal players from output
gap and ination deviations: 1:0880 and 1:0782, respectively. In contrast, under regime C, scal players: (i)
do not try to free-ride on each other and (ii) take into account positive spillovers from other scal policies.
Accordingly, they pursue a more active scal policy which is associated with the increased scal stabilisation
cost from 0:0285 to 0:1890 and diminished losses from output gap and ination deviations (1:0596 and 0:8725
respectively). The attitude of the central bank is crucial at this point. As under a symmetric ination shock,
there is clearly a policy conict between scal and monetary authorities, increased scal activity should urge
the central bank to more restrictive monetary policy than under the non-cooperative regime N. However, in
the grand coalition all players, including the central bank, cooperate, and, secondly, the objective of every
player is dierent than under non-cooperation as all of them aim to minimise the joint loss function which is
a weighted sum of individual losses. Thus, in our benchmark, where all players have an equal weight in every
coalition, the central bank's objective function (9) counts only for a quarter of the common loss function in
31The term "free-riding" refers here to taking advantage of others' stabilisation policies during the stabilisation game (i.e. from
time t0; when the shock occurs, onwards). However, this term will be also used in the context of individual players breaking-up
coalitional arrangements (with the same objective to take advantage of others' cooperative stabilisation policies but themselves
playing non-cooperatively and constraining own costly policies).
14Figure 1: Benchmark model, v
0S; comparison of regimes N; C and F:
regime C: Consequently, this function is "biased" towards scal preferences. Interestingly, under regime C
these are scal players which nd it protable to change their policies so that there is no conict between
authorities about the direction of the stabilisation policies. Deviations of scal debts and the interest rate
from the rules is shown in the upper part of Figure 1. Under regime N both authorities deviate positively
from the rules, which is counter-active as scal debt inuences output gap in the opposite way to (nominal
and real) interest rates. In contrast, when scal and monetary authorities cooperate, scal authorities deviate
positively from the rule until period 10 and negatively since then. The sign of the central bank's deviations
is exactly opposite; hence, both control instruments inuence the output gap always in the same direction.
In addition to the consent on policy direction, the lack of free-riding makes all the policies more active. All
in all, cooperation makes the grand coalition the most attractive regime from the social point of view.
As far as now we have analysed our results mainly from the social perspective. However, even the regime
which is the most desirable from the social point of view, can be very dicult to attain in the self-oriented
environment. This is, for instance, the case for the grand coalition in Table 3. In a self-oriented myopic
environment it could be very dicult to enforce this form of coordination, because every scal player has an
incentive to unilaterally deviate from C:32 For instance, C1 prefers [1j23j4] to C, thus, would break up the
grand coalition, with hope that C2 and C3 maintain cooperation. In other words, there are strong free-riding
incentives in the case of symmetric ination shock to deviate from full cooperation. On the other hand, if the
assumption of myopic behaviour is waived regime C is more likely to be stable, as it is clear that no partial
scal cooperation is sustainable as any scal player involved in coalition would prefer to break it and play in
the non-cooperative regime N:
The situation is completely dierent under regime F, where the central bank does not cooperate with
the coalition of all scal authorities. As before, coordination of policies among governments eliminates the
free-riding and alleviates the use of scal instruments. However, it is clear from the decomposed losses in
Table 3 that it exacerbates the conict with the central bank as the loss from control eort is much higher
in this regime both for governments and for the central bank. The policies are counter-active (see the upper
part of Figure 1) and the payo for an increased control action is limited to only a little lower ination and
output gap deviations, which, by far, cannot make up for the increased loss. As a consequence, full scal
coordination is worse than both cooperative and non-cooperative regimes. This latter result is exactly in line
with the conclusions of Beetsma et al. (2001).33 The dierence between the results of both analyses is in the
direction of the policies. In our model, when all scal players decide to cooperate, the central bank pursues
more expansionary monetary policies than the assumed Taylor rule, whereas, the scal authorities pursue a
more restrictive scal policy than the assumed scal rule. The direction of policies is, therefore, opposite to
Beetsma et al. (2001), where supply shocks lead to more restrictive monetary policy vs. further reaching
scal expansion.34 However, in both studies a regime in which scal players cooperate against the central
32Deviations from a coalition are related to the coalition formation theory concept of internal stability (see Plasmans et al.,
2006a, for further details).
33Note that Beetsma et al. (2001) do not consider coordination in a grand coalition.
34It might be argued that the above high cost of stabilisation is caused by the specic choice of policy rules which is so far
15r 4=5 2=3 1=2 1=4 1=8 1=11
C1=C2=C3 5.2284 3.5100 2.6245 2.1211 1.9996 1.9349
CB 3.3077 3.9074 4.5186 5.3308 5.8425 6.3451
JU(t0) 18.9931 14.4376 12.3922 11.6944 11.8416 12.1499
J
U(t0) 7.6804 6.4859 6.1297 6.3675 6.7652 7.2276
F;C1^ 2
C1 0.5900 0.6982 0.7945 0.8725 0.8665 0.8426
F;C1^ y2
C1 1.3289 1.1666 1.0942 1.0596 1.0519 1.0490
F;C1
c ^ f2
C1 3.3095 1.6451 0.7357 0.1890 0.0812 0.0432
CB^ 2
CB 2.9500 3.4913 3.9728 4.3627 4.3329 4.2131
CB^ y2
CB 0.2657 0.2333 0.2188 0.2119 0.2103 0.2098
CBb ^ {
2
U 0.0919 0.1827 0.3269 0.7561 1.2992 1.9222
Table 4: Optimal losses for symmetric ination shock, dierent relative bargaining powers of the central bank
bank is counter-productive.













cooperation in the grand coalition or in a partial scal coalition is better than playing alone. The analysis
of P regimes follows similar lines as the discussion of the grand coalition case. Starting from the non-
cooperation, the creation of partial scal coalition eliminates free-riding incentives between two governments





C2 increase symmetrically from 0:0285 to 0:2541. This increase is higher than the increase for the
grand coalition, thus, it cannot be justied only by the diminished free-riding incentives. At the same time
F;C1
c ^ f2
C3 also increases (from 0:0285 to 0:0336), instead of decreasing.35 Both the above results are to be
explained by the more constrained activity of the central bank, which is caused by the asymmetry of output
gap and ination in this regime that makes union-wide averages less volatile and, therefore, not aecting the
loss of a monetary authority to such an extent as before. In other words, the central bank is able to free-ride
even more than in regime N and this, in turn, increases the use of control instrument in both scal players
involved in a coalition and playing non-cooperatively.
In the above discussion, we have touched upon a very important issue of relative bargaining power between
scal authorities and the central bank in the grand coalition. As the weight of the central bank's loss in
the sum of losses is only 25% under symmetric bargaining power, the common objective is biased towards
preferences of scal policymakers in the benchmark. However, these preferences, are rather dierent than
social loss which is at the very centre of our interests (see Table 2). Thus, it is interesting to look for alternative
bargaining power schemes in regime C: Let r := CB
C1+C2+C3+CB be the relative weight of the central bank
with respect to the whole grand coalition. Table 4 presents decomposition of losses for dierent values of r
under regime C.36 For r = 4
5 the central bank is the most and for r = 1
11 the least powerful whereas the
intermediate regimes are in between. The more powerful the central bank in the grand coalition is, the more
the common objective is biased towards ination stabilisation. This is reected by diminishing loss from the
ination deviation over time. At the same time, the output gap becomes less important; thus, its volatility
increases for higher values of the central bank's bargaining power, and vice versa. Similar conclusions can
be drawn for control instruments in Table 4. For high values of r interest rate volatility is very expensive
w.r.t. volatility of the scal debt, which urges governments to take over stabilisation eorts. For low values
of r the situation is reversed and the central bank bares most of the stabilisation burden. That is why the
loss from scal debt volatility over time grows with the central bank's bargaining power and loss from the
interest rate volatility over time diminishes, and vice versa.
away from optimum that players are forced to deviate much. In other words, it might be argued that M
 should be closer
to 1 and i
 closer to 0: However, in other regimes, even in the fully non-cooperative regime, players are able to choose paths
of stabilisation instruments close to assumed policy rules. This clearly overlures such an objection. Futhermore, the results
reported in Table 3 were checked also for other parametrisations of policy rules such as: (M
 = 1:5; i
= 0); (M
 = 1; i
=  0:5);
(M
 = 1:25; i
= 0); or (M
 = 1; i
= 0) and produce similar results (under all the above assumptions).
35The decrease in C3 control eort would be expected as the cooperation between C1 and C2; by increasing their activism,
gives even more incentives to free-ride.
36Losses of countries C2 and C3 are not reported since they are symmetric to C1:
16Figure 2: Social loss for dierent bargaining powers of the CB
Figure 2 draws social loss based on JU and J
U from Table 4 against relative bargaining power of the
central bank. It transpires that the lowest social loss based on JU is obtained for the standard symmetric
bargaining weights used in the benchmark simulations (i.e. r = 1
4 as in Table 3). It is caused by the fact
that, in this case, social loss JU which is a simple sum of JF;1; JF;2; JF;3 and JCB directly corresponds to the
common objective of the grand coalition which is 1
4 (JF;1 + JF;2 + JF;3 + JCB) or 1
4JU: The optimal social
loss based on J
U is not obtained for r = 1
4 as it is based on dierent preferences than individual authorities'
loss functions. Values of U; U; f;U and r;U assumed in the benchmark put the same weight to output
gap as well as ination stabilisation and make the interest rate deviations as costly as scal decits ones.
Clearly, it does not correspond to the common loss of the grand coalition (denoted JC) for r = 1
4 as 3 scal
players pay much more attention to output gap than to ination and all three scal debts combined are more
important than interest rate. However, when r = 1
2; the central bank becomes as important as all the scal
players combined and the relative weight of ination w.r.t. output gap in the common loss of the grand
coalition becomes one. In other words, it corresponds now to U=U: Also the relative importance of control
instruments corresponds to f;U=r;U: The only inconsistency between social loss based on J
U and JC is the
relative weight of control instruments to other variables. This is caused by the fact, that individual losses of
monetary and scal authorities have non-zero preferences about both output gaps and ination deviations,
which produces dierent sum than J
U. However, this discrepancy between J
U and JC in our case does not
inuence the outcome in our benchmark and the optimal J
U is found for r = 1
2:37
The above analysis of dierent bargaining powers of the central bank underlines the importance of correct
institutional design of cooperation between scal and monetary players. It should be kept in mind that the
central bank is outnumbered in any monetary union (as it consists of at least 2 countries, by denition)
as, for instance, in the multi-country EMU. Thus, the coordination arrangements should be structured in
such a way that the individual losses of scal and monetary authorities are transformed to a common loss
which is representative for a union (for example, the social loss based on J
U proposed in this paper). This
would require higher bargaining weight of the central bank than the symmetric one, to alleviate the relative
importance of ination and interest rate deviations in the common loss.
Table 5 is constructed in the similar manner to Table 3 and presents (optimal) welfare losses for the




3;0]T = [1;0;0]T. Clearly, not all scal losses
are now symmetric, as shock directly hits the rst country only and other member-states of a monetary union
have to deal with its indirect consequences. However, in general, it can be said that the pattern of losses in













F; full scal cooperation is the worst regime for everybody; the grand coalition performs reasonably well
but myopic scal players would have an incentive to break up this regime; partial scal coordination is not
sustainable as players involved in cooperation would prefer the non-cooperative regime. Finally, it should
be noted that cooperation of a country which is not aected directly by the shock with a country which
















2 social loss based on J




0S) N C F [12j3j4] [13j2j4] [1j23j4]
C1 0.3409 0.3245 1.0848 0.3921 0.3921 0.2807
C2 0.2369 0.2329 1.0495 0.3006 0.1763 0.2896
C3 0.2369 0.2329 1.0495 0.1763 0.3006 0.2896
CB 0.6939 0.5923 2.4270 0.6024 0.6024 0.6084
JU(t0) 1.5092 1.3827 5.6109 1.4715 1.4715 1.4684
J
U(t0) 0.8483 0.7618 3.3804 0.7898 0.7898 0.7932
F;C1^ 2
C1 0.1659 0.1461 0.1584 0.1509 0.1509 0.1541
F;C1^ y2
C1 0.1681 0.1679 0.1607 0.2183 0.2183 0.1100
F;C1
c ^ f2
C1 0.0069 0.0104 0.7656 0.0228 0.0228 0.0165
F;C2^ 2
C2 0.1067 0.0823 0.0970 0.0896 0.0924 0.0899
F;C2^ y2
C2 0.1266 0.1215 0.1253 0.1573 0.0760 0.1512
F;C2
c ^ f2
C2 0.0035 0.0291 0.8270 0.0536 0.0078 0.0483
F;C3^ 2
C3 0.1067 0.0823 0.0970 0.0924 0.0896 0.0899
F;C3^ y2
C3 0.1266 0.1215 0.1253 0.0760 0.1573 0.1512
F;C3
c ^ f2
C3 0.0035 0.0291 0.8270 0.0078 0.0536 0.0483
CB^ 2
CB 0.5990 0.4847 0.5544 0.5220 0.5220 0.5230
CB^ y2
CB 0.0241 0.0235 0.0235 0.0242 0.0242 0.0242
CBb ^ {
2
U 0.0707 0.0840 1.8490 0.0561 0.0561 0.0612
Table 5: Optimal losses for asymmetric ination shock, baseline parametrisation
is aected (regimes [12j3j4] or [13j2j4]) is very unprotable for both of them but especially for the former
one. Furthermore, also cooperation of both countries which are not aected directly by the shock (regime
[1j23j4]) is also not protable when compared to non-cooperation. Consequently, any form of partial scal
cooperation when the correlation of shocks gets smaller seems to be unsustainable in the case of a symmetric
ination shock.
Losses in this case are smaller as for the symmetric ination shock because there is a dierent reaction of
the common monetary policy and national scal policies in countries not aected by the shock. This happens
because the central bank targets average ination which in the case of an asymmetric shock is clearly much
smaller than in case of a symmetric one (see Figure 3). Also, the national scal policies of C2 and C3 react
more moderately since these countries are only aected by cross border-spillovers and the restrained reaction
of the common monetary policy.
The above ndings, in general, correspond to the main arguments of Beetsma et al. (2001). Indeed, the
clash between authorities is diminished under an asymmetric ination shock because many eects cancel each
other and policymakers have less incentives to excaberate the dispute. However, in our model, the extent
of the conict is still so substantial, that the excessive use of control instruments make the regime of scal
cooperation, by far, unprotable.
5.3 Output shocks










T :38 This type of a shock causes union-wide increase in ination, which
is tackled by all authorities with restrictive stabilisation policies (scal decits are negative whereas interest
rate positive and above ination). Since targeting excessive output gap is the only way to control ination,
there is, in principle, no conict between the governments and the central bank about policy orientation.
However, as we will show in our analysis there is still a conict between both types of policymakers regarding
the priorities of stabilisation. The authorities struggle over the dynamics of the output gap and ination
adjustment which is visible mainly in the initial periods in the aftermath of the shock, as they, to a large
extent, determine the whole adjustment path and, consequently, players' losses. Such an eect could not be
seen in the static model of Beetsma et al. (2001) which conrms that our dynamic analysis is an interesting
extension of the literature.
38All (optimal) losses are multiplied by the factor 104:
18Figure 3: Benchmark model, v
0S vs. v
0A; regime N
The rst observation from Table 6 is that in regime N players do not free-ride when compared to regime
C. To gain more intuition behind it the dynamics of relevant variables are shown in Figure 4. In contrast to
Figure 1, the deviation of control instruments from the rules is much smaller under C than under N: Clearly,
the nature of the output gap shock is dierent then the nature of the ination shock. Both control policies
have, in general, the same direction, but, in our complex dynamic setting, there is an ongoing conict between
authorities concerning the detailed path along which output gap should be stabilised. To investigate deeper
this issue we depicted in Figure 4 two situations. In the rst one the central bank sticks to the Taylor rule
whereas in the second one scal authorities stick to their rules. By comparing both scenarios we see what one
type of the authority would do if the other one did not use its control instrument. It is obvious that the rst
few periods are crucial for the speed of the output gap and ination convergence. Both scal and monetary
authorities target an IS curve but governments are primarily interested in the lowest deviation of output gap,
whereas, for the central bank, the output gap is mainly a tool used to suppress ination. Thus, scal players'
policy is designed in such a way that output gap reaches its peak relatively early and then, for a number of
periods, converges to the equilibrium quicker than it would be preferred by the central bank. Only after a
while, when the deviation of output gap gets much closer to zero, the situation changes. In other words, for
a price of higher output gap instability in the latter periods scal players gain lower output gap instability in
the aftermath of the shock. Clearly, taking a non-zero discounting factor in the governments' objectives into
account, such a strategy is optimal for scal players. In contrast, the central bank, which, in general deviates
from the rule upwards, i.e. conducts even more restrictive monetary policy than Taylor rule, at the moment
when output gap surpasses its peak changes to less restrictive policy (negative deviation from the rule). Such
a move makes output gap deviation to be more persistent initially and then more steeply converging to the
equilibrium. In turn, steeper convergence of output gap leads to quicker convergence of ination which the
central bank is mostly interested in.
The above conict about initial periods of output gap and ination stabilisation is the reason for a
players' behaviour visible in Figure 4. Whereas in the grand coalition case, stabilisation policies are perfectly
complementary and operating in exactly the same direction, under N in the neighborhood of period t = 10
they have opposite signs and oset each other. This leads to excessive losses from control instruments under
regime N w.r.t. C in Table 6 compared to Table 3.
Overall, it can be said that in the case of a symmetric output gap shock scal players try to free-ride
on other scal players policies but, clearly, they are conicted with the central bank which increases their
losses compared to non-cooperation. The free-riding of scal players on each other under N is benecial for
the same reason as before. When they join up a full scal coalition (i.e. create regime F), they have no
more incentives to free-ride and increase their activity which exacerbates the conict with the central bank.
However, this conict is much less pronounced in Table 6 than in Table 3 (scal control eort for v
0S grows
from 0.0285 to 7.2424 whereas for v
y
0S from 0.0246 to 0.0980).
The other dierence between symmetric ination and output gap shocks is that, in the case of the latter,
being outside partial scal cooperation is not protable any more. In other words, all the losses of scal
players in the partial scal cooperation regime are higher than in the grand coalition as well as the non-
19(sc1;v
y
0S) N C F [12j3j4] [13j2j4] [1j23j4] NF FF
C1 0.3061 0.2852 0.3753 0.3092 0.3092 0.3094 0.2829 0.2827
C2 0.3061 0.2852 0.3753 0.3092 0.3094 0.3092 0.2829 0.2827
C3 0.3061 0.2852 0.3753 0.3094 0.3092 0.3092 0.2829 0.2827
CB 0.4977 0.5196 0.7901 0.4896 0.4896 0.4896 0.6000 0.6083
JU(t0) 1.4162 1.3755 1.9161 1.4174 1.4174 1.4174 1.4490 1.4564
J
U(t0) 0.6805 0.6776 1.0319 0.6764 0.6764 0.6764 0.7364 0.7428
F;C1^ 2
C1 0.0838 0.0898 0.0976 0.0827 0.0827 0.0826 0.1133 0.1150
F;C1^ y2
C1 0.1975 0.1871 0.1796 0.1992 0.1992 0.1985 0.1679 0.1665
F;C1
c ^ f2
C1 0.0247 0.0082 0.0980 0.0272 0.0272 0.0281 0.0017 0.0011
F;C2^ 2
C2 0.0838 0.0898 0.0976 0.0827 0.0826 0.0827 0.1133 0.1150
F;C2^ y2
C2 0.1975 0.1871 0.1796 0.1992 0.1985 0.1992 0.1679 0.1665
F;C2
c ^ f2
C2 0.0247 0.0082 0.0980 0.0272 0.0281 0.0272 0.0017 0.0011
F;C3^ 2
C3 0.0838 0.0898 0.0976 0.0826 0.0827 0.0827 0.1133 0.1150
F;C3^ y2
C3 0.1975 0.1871 0.1796 0.1985 0.1992 0.1992 0.1679 0.1665
F;C3
c ^ f2
C3 0.0247 0.0082 0.0980 0.0281 0.0272 0.0272 0.0017 0.0011
CB^ 2
CB 0.4193 0.4493 0.4880 0.4135 0.4135 0.4135 0.5665 0.5750
CB^ y2
CB 0.0395 0.0374 0.0359 0.0398 0.0398 0.0398 0.0335 0.0333
CBb ^ {
2
U 0.0388 0.0328 0.2661 0.0362 0.0362 0.0362 0 0
Table 6: Optimal losses for symmetric output gap shock, baseline parametrisation
cooperative regime. Thus, in the case of output shock, scal players do not have free-riding incentives to
deviate from regime C: In contrast, now the central bank would opt out as C is the second worst solution
out of all for the monetary authority. Under a myopic behavioural assumption (Nash conjecture), such a
deviation would not be exercised as the central bank, considering only immediate consequences of its decision,
would not like to end up in F: However, if this assumption is waived, it is clear that scal players would break
up F to end up in much more preferred N: Consequently, conversely to the ination shocks case, the grand
coalition under symmetric output shock is not sustainable when myopic assumption about players behaviour
is waived and it is the central bank, and not the scal authorities, which has an incentive to deviate from
this cooperation arrangement.
As far as the social loss is concerned, the preference ordering over regimes changes substantially in the case
of symmetric output shock. In spite of the fact that partial scal cooperation is inferior for scal players w.r.t.
non-cooperation or the grand coalition, the social loss in these regimes is the lowest. The grand coalition is still













However, it should be noted that dierences in social losses between all the regimes are substantially smaller











U(N) equal to 89:12%
and 93:57%; respectively. This means that there are 10:88% and 6:03% welfare gains from coordination in












U(N) equal to 99:57% and 99:40%;
respectively. Obviously, welfare gains are much smaller in the latter case. So small dierences between social
loss in dierent regimes suggest that the preference ordering over regimes N;C and P stemming from Table 6
might be relatively easily changed under alternative set of parameters. This will be one of the issues studied
in the sensitivity analysis section.
Finally, Table 7 contains welfare losses for the asymmetric (country specic) output shock which, similarly






The asymmetry of shock leads to asymmetry in scal policy stance. Countries C2 and C3, which are only
indirectly aected by the shock, do not pursue a scal policy too actively (i.e. they try to free-ride on others'
stabilisation eort as before). In contrast, C1 which potential losses are the highest, is forced to more keen
reaction to the shock. This, in turn, makes the situation more asymmetric for the central bank and increases
his control eort w.r.t. the grand coalition.
There are two important dierences between the pattern of losses in Table 7 and previous cases. First of












 F; i.e. from the social point of view non-
20Figure 4: Symmetric output gap shock, regimes N; C and F
cooperative regime becomes more attractive than partial scal cooperation. Secondly, full scal cooperation is
still the worst regime from the social perspective, however, in contrast to other shocks, it is not ultimately the
worst regime for all individual players. In particular, the country which is directly aected by the asymmetric
output gap shock prefers F to any form of non-cooperation, namely N and [1j23j4]: Of course, the full scal
coalition is not sustainable as this is the worst choice for all the other players, but the dierences between
losses in regime F and other regimes are, by far, less pronounced compared to the ination shock cases.
Thus, it can be said that in the case of asymmetric output shock the conict between scal and monetary
players is much less distinct. Also, similarly to the symmetric shock case, the dierences between social loss
(in terms of J



































U(N) are 99:20%; 101:36% and 102:32%; hence, relatively, there is much less to
gain from coordination in the latter case and preference ordering over regimes N; C and P might be sensitive
to parametrisation.
The above results conrm to large extent ndings of Beetsma et al. (2001) which claim that scal
cooperation is likely to be protable when the asymmetry of shocks increases. Such a situation emerges in
our model for the asymmetric output shock, albeit regime F is not protable from the social point of view.
However, the conict between scal and monetary authorities is substantially less pronounced than in other
cases analysed before, especially involving ination shocks.
5.4 Sensitivity analysis
Thus far, we have studied a number of cases characterised by dierent forms of coordination. It is interesting
to perform sensitivity analyses of the model in order to identify which results (possibly) prevail and which
parameters contribute mostly to particular outcomes. Some elements of a sensitivity analysis have been
already present in the discussion above. In particular, we have inquired what happens to the social loss
when alternative weights of the central bank in the grand coalitions are assumed. Additionally, we performed
sensitivity analysis in three other dimensions:
1. Similarly to Beetsma et al. (2001) or Beetsma and Jensen (2005) we vary one structural parameter of
the model at a time, assuming that it has either a high or a low value. Additionally, we perform not
only one but a number (usually 4 or 5) of simulations in the neighbourhood of each high and low value;
2. Furthermore, we study various combinations of preference parameters in the loss functions of players.
In particular, dierent ratios of preferences towards output gap and ination are considered;
3. In the next step, the sensitivity analysis of governments' preferences is performed. A particular attention
will be paid to the government preference parameter i which dierent values can be interpreted as
levels of the SGP stringency.
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0A) N C F [12j3j4] [13j2j4] [1j23j4]
C1 0.7392 0.7158 0.7245 0.7174 0.7174 0.7656
C2 0.0481 0.0514 0.0621 0.0580 0.0558 0.0491
C3 0.0481 0.0514 0.0621 0.0558 0.0580 0.0491
CB 0.0553 0.0577 0.0877 0.0607 0.0607 0.0514
JU(t0) 0.8881 0.8765 0.9366 0.8920 0.8920 0.9153
J
U(t0) 0.3235 0.3209 0.3602 0.3279 0.3279 0.3310
F;C1^ 2
C1 0.0147 0.0153 0.0160 0.0155 0.0155 0.0143
F;C1^ y2
C1 0.6496 0.6400 0.6347 0.6579 0.6579 0.7062
F;C1
c ^ f2
C1 0.0748 0.0604 0.0736 0.0438 0.0438 0.0451
F;C2^ 2
C2 0.0082 0.0089 0.0098 0.0091 0.0087 0.0068
F;C2^ y2
C2 0.0344 0.0353 0.0367 0.0323 0.0444 0.0380
F;C2
c ^ f2
C2 0.0054 0.0072 0.0155 0.0164 0.0026 0.0042
F;C3^ 2
C3 0.0082 0.0089 0.0098 0.0087 0.0091 0.0068
F;C3^ y2
C3 0.0344 0.0353 0.0367 0.0444 0.0323 0.0380
F;C3
c ^ f2
C3 0.0054 0.0072 0.0155 0.0026 0.0164 0.0042
CB^ 2
CB 0.0465 0.0499 0.0542 0.0503 0.0503 0.0411
CB^ y2
CB 0.0043 0.0041 0.0039 0.0041 0.0041 0.0047
CBb ^ {
2
U 0.0043 0.0036 0.0295 0.0062 0.0062 0.0056
Table 7: Optimal losses for asymmetric output gap shock, benchmark parametrisation
The detailed description of the obtained results is available in the on-line appendix (Sections A1-A4).
The structural parameter sensitivity check reveals that the degree of output gap backward-lookingness is the
key parameter, which can either magnify or diminish the conict between scal and monetary authorities.
Counter-intuitively, it turns out that cooperation can be more eective when the economies are relatively
more backward-looking. Backward-lookingness makes economies more rigid and therefore more dicult to
control which, in turn, should lead to increased control eort. This is the main factor inducing conict
with the CB in the benchmark and resulting in higher losses in the full scal cooperation regime. However,
when a certain threshold is triggered, the players realise that there is no point in setting o each other's
policies as their inuence on the economy becomes too limited. Consequently, they all decide to refrain
from excessive actions and instead of colliding their policies, governments try to free-ride on the central
bank's control eort and vice versa. Interestingly, this is not the case under the non-cooperative regime.
Instead, in this type of regime, conict between authorities increases together with the backward-lookingness
of the output gap. Consequently, when the rigidity of the output gap becomes high enough, non-cooperation
starts to become inferior w.r.t. scal cooperation. In other words, the situation is the exact reversal of
that of the baseline analysis. In the benchmark case, characterised by high forward-lookingness, free-riding
diminishes the conict between scal and monetary authorities under non-coordination. However, under
scal coordination, the struggle between governments and the CB increases everybody's loss. When high
backward-lookingness is assumed, the conict is exaggerated under non-cooperation, whereas under scal
cooperation, authorities try to free-ride on each others' policies.
The second factor which heavily inuences the results of our benchmark analysis is the relative conict
between preferences of scal and monetary authorities. The more governments exclusively focus on output
gap stabilisation and the more CBs focus on ination stabilisation, the more pronounced the conict between
them becomes. Consequently, the counter-protable eects of full scal cooperation are even greater. On the
other hand, when the preferences of both types of players are more alike, there is less reason for conct and
scal cooperation becomes, from the social point of view, benecial. More specically, full scal cooperation
initially becomes benecial w.r.t. the non-cooperative regime, before subsequently becoming more benecial
w.r.t. partial scal cooperation regime and nally, more benecial w.r.t. the grand coalition. This last eect
is counter-intuitive as, by denition, the grand coalition always minimises the sum of the losses of all the
players in the LQDGs. However, in our analysis we mainly refer to our own denition of the social loss in
which, as has been mentioned previously, the cost of interest rate deviation from the rule is properly weighted
to correspond to the one-country case. Consequently, our social optimum does not necessarily agree with the
grand coalition. In fact, when the loss functions of governments and central banks become very alike, social
22loss obtained under scal cooperation tends to be smaller than under the grand coalition. This is caused
by the fact that, in the simple sum of players losses, the weight of the control instrument of a monetary
authority is relatively small w.r.t. scal debts of individual governments. This creates an incentive to use
it more extensively. If the importance of interest rate is appropriately rescaled in the social loss, the grand
coalition is no longer the most protable regime.
Using numerical simulations, we study the way in which various combinations of policy rules' parameters
inuence output gap and ination volatility. We also determine which of such combinations are likely to result
in a(n) (near) optimal outcome from the social point of view. In the non-cooperative regime, and under a
symmetric ination shock, the proximity of the social optimum is reached for the combination of rules in
which the central bank follows the standard Taylor rule, yet there is no automatic scal stabiliser to output.
However, we show that if players in a monetary union were able to unilaterally choose their rules, the social
optimum combination would not be sustainable. This is because the monetary authority has incentives to
increase its automatic reaction to ination and, at the same time, the government has incentives to increase
its reaction to output gap. When these things occur simultaneously, the economies end up in a position that
is suboptimal, not only from the social point of view, but also from the perspective of the individual.
Finally, we study various scenarios characterised by dierent levels of the SGP stringency and show that
it is the third factor that is pivotal to the benchmark results. The increased SGP stringency reduces the
incentives for scal players to use control instruments. Therefore, in situations where high social losses
were driven by the conict between authorities (notably full scal cooperation regime), this rmer stance is
benecial to the union-wide economic interest. However, in situations where free-riding is present (notably
non-cooperative regime under benchmark parametrisation), increased SGP stringency may lead to more
extensive free-riding of governments, since controlling the economy becomes much more costly. This, in turn,
forces the CB to intervene and increases social loss of the union. In other words, the stringent SGP has
both positive and negative eects in the context of this paper and is able to render unprotable full scal
cooperation regime protable w.r.t. non-cooperation.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we considered a number of important issues concerning the policy coordination in the monetary
union which have recently been discussed in the literature. In relation to this, we proposed a (stylised) Multi-
Country New-Keynesian Monetary Union Model cast in the framework of linear quadratic dierential games
which can be used to simulate strategic interactions between an arbitrary number of scal authorities who
interact in coalitions either in cooperation with or against the common central bank. In the above setting,
we studied various coordination arrangements, including partial scal cooperation between only a subgroup
of countries, which, to the best of our knowledge, had not previously been considered in the literature.
Our results, follow those of Beetsma et al. (2001) but in a much richer dynamic setting. Whereas free-
riding in economics and social sciences is usually associated with ineciency and losses, in our model, for
many parameter combinations, scal cooperation between all countries in a monetary union turns out to
be counter-productive as a result of exacerbated conict with the central bank. Thus, the non-cooperative
regime, in which policy-makers free-ride on each others' stabilisation eorts, is more protable. The relative
performance of scal cooperation is worst in the case of a symmetric ination shock. When the shock is
asymmetric, the response of the central bank to an average ination in the union is more moderate, as are
the losses of all the authorities.
In contrast to ination shocks, under an output gap shock, there is no conict between policy-makers
regarding the general orientation of stabilisation policies. Both for scal and monetary authorities, it is of
paramount importance to suppress output gap deviation. For the central bank, in particular, this is a method
of tackling ination instability. All in all, the relative dierence between non-cooperative regime and scal
coordination, as well as, symmetric and asymmetric shocks is much smaller than in the case of ination shock.
In addition to the above results, in our multi-country framework, we were able to study intermediate
regimes, in which only a subgroup of the scal players cooperate. Such a solution turns out to be interesting,
especially from the common perspective. When a unity of governments is broken and they no longer optimize
the common objective function, then the free-riding element is back into play and the ultimate choice of
optimal policies is much less intense. Nevertheless, such regimes can be dicult to sustain, as they lead to a
deteriorated position of some individual countries.
Furthermore, we discussed the eectiveness of the grand coalition, i.e. cooperation between all scal
authorities and the monetary authority. Although this regime is protable from the social point of view, it
23seems unlikely that it could be sustained without the creation of a central control or an eective transfer
system. Since the situation is caused by the fact that individual countries are often worse o in the grand
coalition than if they were in the non-cooperative regime, these countries are not willing to accept such a
regime without compensation.
We also showed that the design of a common objective function for the grand coalition is of the utmost
importance for the outcome of the stabilisation process. If a relative power of the central bank is too weak,
then monetary control instrument is likely to be overused. This is because nominal interest rate aecting all
the countries is, after all, much easier (cheaper) to use than national scal decits.
Finally, we performed an extensive sensitivity check of our results and determined three variables that are
pivotal to the results we obtained for the benchmark of our model: (i) the degree of forward-lookingness in
the union's economies; (ii) the preference conict between scal and monetary authorities; and (iii) the SGP
stringency. The last analysis reveals the most interesting nding as long as the issue of scal cooperation is
concerned. Since, the main source of the relative ineciency of full scal cooperation is an increased conict
with the central bank due to more intensive use of a control instrument. Higher levels of SGP stringency
mean that the use of scal debt becomes less and less attractive. This, in turn, removes the reason for conict
between two types of authorities.
The following policy conclusions stem from the above results. In general, the grand coalition is the
most eective regime, however, only if the design of a cooperative arrangement takes into account a specic
nature of a central bank and its policy instruments. However, this regime is dicult to implement due to
various problems. In particular, the very nature of such a coalition jeopardizes the idea of the independent
central bank. On the other hand, under special circumstances, like present nancial crises that spreads
to other sectors of global economy, we already witness various forms of cooperation between the ECB and
the EMU Member States as well as EU Member States. However, in general, both de jure and de facto
state of the aairs in the EMU can be described best by the non-cooperative regime. Since the grand
coalition is rather out of question in the long term, inter-governmental coordination appears to be another
interesting alternative. With respect to this, our results show that obligatory scal coordination between all
the countries within the union can be counter-productive and that smaller coalitions of countries should be
considered. This corresponds to the ndings of the literature on voluntary environmental agreements that
suggest that local solutions are more stable than centralised approach as for instance the Kyoto Protocol.
Similarly, partial scal cooperation can be an interesting option as far as macroeconomic policy coordination
is concerned. However, if (possibly multiple) partial agreements are not feasible for political reasons, then
full scal coordination can be considered again in conjunction with the increased stringency of the SGP. The
SGP should contain an increase in scal activity induced by cooperation.
Our analysis can be extended in several important directions. Although we considered both symmetric and
asymmetric shocks in our analysis, we assumed full symmetry of monetary union member states. Following
on from this, it would be benecial to carry out an analysis of an asymmetric model, in terms of both the
economies structures and the players preferences. Furthermore, since our results suggest that more attention
should be devoted to partial forms of cooperation between the governments of a monetary union, we would
like to extend our analysis to (at least) a four-country case, where two non-trivial scal coalitions may coexist
in one single coalition structure. Finally, it could be interesting to consider how the results obtained in this
paper are altered by the introduction of a federal scal transfer system in a monetary union.39
39An example of such an analysis (albeit only in a two-country setting) can be found in Plasmans et al. (2006), Chapter 3.
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